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may	be	enforced	either	before	or	after	the	Medicaid	recipient’s	
death	by	the	filing	of	an	action	to	foreclose	the	lien	in	the	county	
district court (or through an estate probate court action), it may be 
enforced	only	after	the	death	of	the	recipient’s	surviving	spouse	
and (1) when there is no child who is 20 years old or less residing in 
the home; (2) when there is no adult child who is blind or disabled 
that resides in the home, and (3) when there is no brother or sister 
of the Medicaid recipient that lawfully resides in the home who has 
resided there for at least a year immediately before the date of the 
Medicaid	recipient’s	admission	to	the	nursing	or	medical	facility,	
and has resided there on a continuous basis since that time. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1).
6 Id. 
7 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1) provides that, as a condition of 
eligibility, the individual must assign to the state any rights to 
payment for medical care from any third party.  
8 Under the typical state statute, the lien is dissolved if the 
Medicaid recipient leaves the nursing facility and resides in 
the property subject to the lien for a period of more than 90 
days without being readmitted as an inpatient to a nursing or 
medical facility, even though there may have been no reasonable
expectation that this would occur. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-
709(6)(D). If the Medicaid recipient is readmitted to a nursing 
or medical facility during this period, and does return home after 
being released, another 90 days must be completed before the lien 
can be dissolved. Id. The lien also becomes dormant and ceases 
to operate as a lien if the state Medicaid agency does not take 
action	to	foreclose	the	lien	within	10	years	of	filing	the	lien.		Id. 
The dormant lien may be revived in the same manner as a dormant 
judgment is revived under Kansas law.  Id. 
9 Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al. v. 
Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006).
10 Id. 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a).
12 Ahlborn v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human 
Services, 280 F. Supp. 2d 881 (E.D. Ark. 2003). 
13 Id., 397 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2005). 
14 Id., cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
15 Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al. v. 
Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006).
16 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006).
17 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(4). 
18 Iowa Code § 249A.6(1). 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
PRESCRIPTIVE ACQUISITION. Note: prescriptive 
acquisition is a civil law doctrine similar to adverse possession. 
The plaintiffs owned land south of the disputed property which had 
been in the family since 1940. The plaintiffs presented evidence 
that the disputed property had been used by family members 
since that time for recreation, pasture, hunting and farming. The 
defendants purchased their land neighboring the disputed property 
in 1963 and claimed that purchase included the disputed property. 
The defendants paid taxes on the disputed property from that 
time and argued that the purchase of the property interrupted the 
adverse possession of the disputed property by the plaintiffs. The 
defendants acknowledged that they had not exercised physical 
occupation of the land but argued that the payment of taxes and 
occasional	viewing	of	the	land	were	sufficient	to	maintain	title	
to the land. The defendant also pointed to the fact that when 
they purchased their land in 1963, an ancestor of the plaintiffs 
had offered to buy the disputed property from the defendants, 
indicating that the plaintiffs knew that they did not own the 
land. Finally, the defendants had executed mineral leases for the 
disputed property and argued that all of their actions involving 
the	property	interrupted	the	plaintiff’s	possession	of	the	land.	The	 
court	held	that	the	activities	of	the	plaintiffs	were	sufficient	exercise	
of control over the property for over 30 years to pass title to them
under prescriptive acquisition. The court noted that, even if the 
actions	of	the	defendants	interrupted	the	plaintiffs’	possession,	the	
plaintiffs’	activities	on	the	disputed	property	re-established	control	
and possession within one year and, under La. Civ. Code art. 3465, 
repossession within one year removes the interruption. Prince v. 
Palermo Land Co., 2006 La. App. LEXIS 1022 (La. Ct. App. 
2006). 
ANIMALS 
BULL. The plaintiff was working with a carpenter in repairing 
the cow barn for the defendant. The defendant did not know that the 
plaintiff was present on the farm or that the plaintiff was working 
in the cow barn. The plaintiff and the carpenter did not know that 
the defendant had a dairy bull loose with the other dairy cows. The 
plaintiff	was	injured	by	the	defendant’s	dairy	bull	while	working	in	
the	barn	and	filed	suit	in	strict	liability	and	negligence	against	the	
defendant and carpenter for the cost of the injuries. Applying the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509, the court held that the standard 
of care for owners of domestic farm animals was that the owner 
would be liable for harm caused by animals which the owner knew 
had vicious propensities. The court held that the defendant was not 
liable	for	the	plaintiff’s	injury	because	the	evidence	demonstrated	 
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that the bull had never attacked any person before the accident. 
The plaintiff argued that bulls were inherently dangerous so as to 
require a higher standard of care, but the court held that the rule in 
New York was that no breed of animal was considered inherently
vicious such that an owner would be deemed to have knowledge 
of vicious propensities. Bard v. Jahnke, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 957 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2006), aff’g, 791 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005). 
BANkRUPTCY 
FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE.	The	debtors,	husband	and	wife,	filed	for	Chapter	
13 and were granted a discharge. After the case was closed, the 
debtors	filed	a	proceeding	in	the	Bankruptcy	Court	against	the	IRS	
for the release of a federal tax lien against their residence involving 
a tax claim discharged in the Chapter 13 proceeding. The Chapter 
13 plan provided that, upon payment of the IRS claim, the tax lien
would be considered void. The plan valued the tax claim at zero 
because	the	IRS	did	not	file	a	proof	of	claim	for	the	underlying	
tax	in	the	case,	although	it	did	file	a	proof	of	claim	for	other	taxes;	
therefore, the debtors argued, the lien was void when the case 
was closed. The court acknowledged that liens are not affected 
by bankruptcy proceedings unless the debtors take some action to 
either pay the underlying claim or otherwise avoid the lien. The 
court held that the IRS lien was voided by the bankruptcy plan 
which	specifically	listed	the	tax	claim	and	the	tax	lien.	Because	the	
IRS failed to object to the bankruptcy plan, the IRS was bound by 
the terms of the plan and was required to release the lien, because
the plan not only discharged the tax claim but also provided for 
release of the lien upon discharge. I.R.S. v. DiPasquale, 2006-1 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,318 (D. N.J. 2006). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
DISASTER PROGRAMS. The FSA has issued interim 
regulations establishing disaster relief programs for agricultural 
producers who suffered losses in Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, 
Ophelia,	 Rita	 and	 Wilma	 in	Alabama,	 Florida,	 Louisiana,	
Mississippi, North Carolina and Texas. The regulations also 
provide for grants to states to assist aquaculture producers who 
suffered losses from the hurricanes. 71 Fed. Reg. 27188 (May 
10, 2006). 
FARM LABOR. The National Agricultural Statistics Service 
has	issued	farm	employment	figures	as	of	April	15,	2006.	There	
were	956,000	hired	workers	on	 the	nation’s	 farms	 and	 ranches	
the week of April 9-15, 2006, down 4 percent from a year ago. Of 
these hired workers, 718,000 workers were hired directly by farm 
operators. Agricultural service employees on farms and ranches 
made up the remaining 238,000 workers. Farm operators paid 
their hired workers an average wage of $9.79 per hour during 
the April 2006 reference week, up 44 cents from a year earlier. 
Field workers received an average of $8.96 per hour, up 40 cents 
from April 2005, while livestock workers earned $9.30 per hour 
compared	 with	 $9.14	 a	 year	 earlier.	 	The	 field	 and	 livestock	
worker combined wage rate, at $9.07 per hour, was up 35 cents 
from last year. The number of hours worked averaged 40.8 hours 
for hired workers during the survey week, up 2 percent from a 
year ago. All NASS reports are available free of charge on the 
internet. For access, go to the NASS Home Page at: http:/www.
usda.gov/nass/. Sp Sy 8 (5-06). 
GUARANTEED LOANS. The FSA has issued proposed 
regulations which amend the guaranteed farm ownership and 
operating loan programs to change the amount of interest charged 
and collected on the loans. The one-time origination fee for 
guaranteed farm ownership loans will be increased from 1 percent 
to 1.5 percent. In addition, an annual continuation fee of 0.75 
percent will be charged for lines of credit for farm operating loans. 
Such fees will not be collected where the fees are prohibited by 
statute, e,g, loans to beginning farmers and ranchers under the 
State Beginning Farmer Program under 7 U.S.C. § 309. 71 Fed. 
Reg. 27978 (May 15, 2006). 
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has 
extended the comment period for the following proposed 
regulations. See 71 Fed. Reg. 11326 (March 7, 2006). The FSIS 
has issued proposed regulations amending the federal meat and 
poultry products inspection regulations to provide that the FSIS 
will make available to the public lists of the retail consignees of 
meat and poultry products that have been voluntarily recalled by 
a federally inspected meat or poultry products establishment if 
product has been distributed to the retail level. FSIS is proposing 
to post routinely these retail consignee lists on its web site as the 
lists	are	developed	by	the	agency	during	its	recall	verification	 
activities. 71 Fed. Reg. 27211 (May 10, 2006). 
PEAS. The GIPSA has announced that it plans to amend the 
U.S.	standards	for	Whole	Dry	Peas	and	Split	Peas	to	provide	a	
separate standard for feed peas to accommodate the difference 
in the markets for feed peas and edible dry peas. 71 Fed. Reg. 
27672 (May 12, 2006). 
TOBACCO. The plaintiffs were tobacco producers who 
owned tobacco quotas eligible for payments under the Tobacco 
Transition Payment Program (TTPP) provided by the Tobacco 
Buyout Statute enacted as part of the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004, 7 U.S.C. § 518 et seq.	The	plaintiff	filed	suit	for	
a declaratory judgment that the regulations promulgated to 
implement the TTPP violated the statute in that the amount paid 
for the quotas was less than the payments required by the statute. 
The	current	issue	was	the	plaintiffs’	request	to	class	certification.	
The	court	granted	class	certification	for	the	following	class	of:	
“all	 burley	 and	flue-cured	 tobacco	 producers	who	 contracted	
for payment under the Regulations (7 C.F.R. § 1463) and 
received less than $ 3.00 multiplied by their 2002 effective
tobacco marketing quota, after being reduced or divided where 
applicable.”	The	court	found	that	(1)	the	class	was	sufficiently	
large so as to make joinder of all plaintiffs reasonable; (2) the class 
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had	sufficiently	common	questions	of	law	or	fact;	(3)	the	class	
had	sufficiently	similar	questions	of	law	or	fact;	(4)	the	class	
could be adequately represented by the major plaintiffs; and (5) 
the defendant has acted toward the class on grounds generally 
applicable to all the class members. Neese v. Johnson, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25344 (W.D. Va. 2006). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent had created an 
inter vivos trust with two persons and two charities as remainder 
beneficiaries.	After	 the	 decedent’s	 death,	 the	 trust	 passed	 to	
the	remainder	holders	in	four	equal	shares.	Each	beneficiary	
was entitled to one-half of their one-quarter share of the trust 
property in 2006 and the remainder in 2016. The trust provided 
that,	if	any	individual	beneficiary	died,	that	person’s	share	would	
pass	to	the	remaining	beneficiaries	equally.	The	estate	claimed	
a deduction for the portion of the trust that was estimated 
would eventually be received by the charities. The IRS denied 
the deduction under I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2) because the trust was 
a split-interest trust which created interests for charities and 
non-charities in the the same property. The estate argued that 
the statute did not apply because the trust essentially created 
two trusts, one for the individuals and one for the charities. The 
court rejected that argument based on Zabel v. United States, 
995 F. Supp. 1036 (D. Neb. 1998), which denied a charitable 
deduction to a similarly structured trust. The estate also argued 
that	I.R.C.	§	2055(e)(2)	was	ambiguous	in	that	it	did	not	define	
a split interest trust; therefore, the court should examine the 
legislative	history	to	determine	whether	the	estate’s	trust	was	
intended to be covered by the statute. The court cited Estate of 
Johnson v. United States, 941 F.2d 1318, 1321 (5th Cir. 1991),
in support of its holding that the statute was not ambiguous; 
therefore, there was no need to discuss the legislative history of 
the	statute.	The	court	noted	that	the	estate’s	trust	did	not	avoid	 
the abuses mentioned in the legislative history in that one of 
the	individual	beneficiaries	could	still	deplete	a	portion	of	the	
trust by ordering the trustee to seek high income, high risk 
investments because all remaining property would pass to the 
charities	and	not	the	individual’s	heirs.	The	court	held	that	the	 
charitable deduction was properly denied. Galloway v. United 
States, 2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,525 (W.D. Penn. 
2006). 
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT.	The	decedent’s	 
estate included a non-qualified deferred annuity contract 
which	had	no	designated	remainder	beneficiary.	The	decedent	
had not begun receiving payments under the annuity. The 
estate executor transferred the annuity to a charity as part of a 
residuary	estate	bequest	under	the	decedent’s	will.	The	issue	
was whether the amount of the annuity paid in excess of the 
decedent’s	 investment	in	the	annuity	is	 income	in	respect	of	 
decedent	only	to	the	beneficiary	of	the	annuity.		The	IRS	ruled	that,	
although I.R.C. § 691(a)(2) provides that the estate is to include 
the IRD from the annuity in income if the annuity is transferred, 
the section does not apply to transfers in satisfaction of a bequest. 
Thus, under I.R.C. § 691(a)(2) and Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4(b)(2), 
if the right to the annuity is transferred to a residuary legatee, the 
IRD income is income of the legatee only. Ltr. Rul. 200618023, 
Jan. 18, 2006. 
RETURNS.	The	decedent’s	estate	was	required	to	file	an	estate	
tax return by August 11, 2001 and was granted an extension of 
time	to	file	and	pay	until	February	11,	2002.	The	estate	made	a	
tax	payment	on	March	15,	2002	and	filed	a	return	on	December	
4,	2002.	The	IRS	assessed	a	late-filing	penalty	and	a	late	payment	
penalty. The estate argued that the penalties were improper because 
(1) the estate relied on the advice of an IRS estate tax attorney that 
an additional automatic extension was available and (2) the estate 
had reasonable cause for the delay because of negotiations to sell 
estate property. The court granted summary judgment for the IRS, 
holding that (1) even if the advice of the attorney had been correct, 
the	estate	tax	return	was	not	filed	within	six	months	after	the	first	 
extension expired and (2) the estate failed to provide any evidence 
to support its claim that the delay in selling estate assets prevented
payment of the estate taxes. Welch v. United States, 2006-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,526 (D. N.J. 2006). 
VALUATION. The taxpayers were members of a large family 
which owned shares of a privately owned corporation. The 
other	 shares	were	owned	by	other	 family	members,	a	nonprofit	
organization established by the family and other independent 
nonprofit	organizations.	The	corporation	bylaws	prohibited	the	sale	
of stock to non-family members or to organizations other than non-
profit	organizations.	The	corporation	hired	an	independent	auditor	
to provide an annual value for the corporation which was used in 
stock sales which occurred over six years prior to the gifts involved 
in the current case. The sales involved some family member-to-
family member sales, although the relationship of some of the 
parties was rather distant, and some were between the organizations 
and family members. The annual audit valuations always included a 
50 percent discount for lack of marketability and when the taxpayers 
filed	gift	tax	returns	for	gifts	of	stock,	they	also	discounted	the	fair	
market value of the stock by 50 percent. The IRS argued that the 
auditor’s	valuation	should	be	ignored	because	the	valuation	was	
not	reached	in	an	arm’s	length	negotiation.	The	IRS	relied	on	its	
own experts who valued the stock using a 30-45 percent discount 
for lack of marketability. The estate used two of the stock sales 
in	the	previous	six	years	to	illustrate	that	the	auditor’s	valuation	
was correct. The court held that the sales demonstrated that the 
50	percent	discount	was	 reached	 in	an	arm’s	 length	 transaction	
because	(1)	some	of	the	sales	were	made	under	a	fiduciary	duty,	
(2) none of the sales was forced, (3) the sellers reasonably relied 
on	the	independent	auditor’s	valuation	and	were	not	required	to	use	
that valuation, and (4) there was no demonstrated donative intent 
in the sales. Huber v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-96. 
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FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
LEGISLATION. On May 17, 2006, President Bush signed the 
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act. H.R. 4297. The 
next issue of the Digest will publish a review of major portions of 
the legislation in an article by Roger McEowen and Neil Harl. 
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer S corporation 
operated several automobile retail businesses. The taxpayer 
valued and reported inventory values using the link-chain, 
dollar-value LIFO inventory method. The IRS determined that 
the taxpayer had improperly calculated inventory value under 
this method for up to 10 years and required the taxpayer to make 
an I.R.C. § 481 adjustment of inventory value and income for 
all open tax years. In addition, the IRS required the taxpayer to 
determine	the	inventory	value	and	income	for	the	first	open	tax	
year based on cumulative adjustments of the previous closed 
tax years. The court upheld the IRS determination because the 
taxpayer’s	error	in	applying	the	accounting	method	was	a	material	
error and not merely a mathematical or posting error. Huffman 
v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. No. 17 (2006). 
The taxpayer had been an attorney for over 30 years and 
decided to retire to begin a business of trading securities in 1999. 
The taxpayer realized short-term losses in 1999. The taxpayer had 
an accountant prepare the income tax return but the accountant 
failed to make the I.R.C. § 475(f) election for the marked-
to-market method of accounting before April 17, 2000. The 
taxpayer hired new professional help and requested an extension 
of	time	to	file	the	election	from	the	IRS.	Although	the	extension	
request	was	filed	after	the	date	for	the	election,	the	original	due	
date	 for	 the	 return,	 the	extension	 request	was	filed	before	 the	
actual	 due	 date	 for	 the	 return	 because	 the	 taxpayer	 had	 filed	
for an automatic extension. The extension was denied because 
the	IRS	found	that	the	taxpayer	had	not	identified	“unusual	and	
compelling circumstances” to support an extension. The court 
held that Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 requires the IRS to grant 
extensions for elections if the taxpayer shows that the taxpayer 
acted	reasonably	and	in	good	faith	and	the	government’s	interests	
will	not	be	prejudiced.	The	 regulations	 lists	five	benchmarks,	
any	one	of	which	is	sufficient	to	show	that	the	taxpayer	acted	
reasonably and in good faith. The court found that the taxpayer 
had	reasonably	relied	on	the	advice	of	an	accountant	 in	filing	
the	1999	return	and	that	the	government’s	interests	would	not	be	
prejudiced	by	an	extension	of	time	to	file	the	election;	therefore,	
the IRS improperly denied the extension. Vines v. Comm’r, 126 
T.C. No. 15 (2006). 
CAPITAL ASSETS. The taxpayer had won a state lottery 
and		received	annual	payments	for	five	years	before	assigning	
the annual payments to a third party in exchange for a lump 
sum payment. The taxpayer reported the assignment as a sale 
of a capital asset with a tax basis of zero. The court, consistent 
with several prior cases, held that the lottery payments were not 
capital assets because there was no underlying investment by the 
taxpayer. Watkins v. Comm’r, No. 04-9016 (10th Cir. May 10, 
2006), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2004-244. 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS. The taxpayer purchased 
29 acres of unimproved land in an historical overlay district. 
15	acres	of	 the	 land	was	 in	a	designated	floodplain.	Because	
the	land	was	in	a	historical	overlay	district	and	in	a	floodplain,	
the land was restricted as to development by county zoning 
laws. The taxpayer transferred a conservation easement to the 
county, which limited the development of the land, although 
the restrictions were no greater than the restrictions already 
imposed by county ordinance. The court held that the easement 
transfer was not eligible for a charitable deduction because the 
easement did not serve any conservation purpose required by 
I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) since the easement did not preserve any 
open space, protect views of the historical areas, or protect 
any historical structures. Turner v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. No. 16 
(2006). 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
filed	a	suit	for	wrongful	discharge	against	a	former	employer.	
The taxpayer received a settlement lump sum payment; however 
the payment was used to pay state and federal employment 
withholding	taxes	and	attorneys’	fees.	The	taxpayer	argued	that	
the settlement payment was either (1) not included in income 
because	the	taxpayer	did	not	receive	any	benefit	of	the	settlement	
or (2) should be taxed over the eight years that were used to 
calculate the back wages paid as part of the settlement. The court 
held that the settlement payment was taxable when received and 
was	all	included	in	the	taxpayer’s	income	because	the	taxpayer	
failed to show that the attorney had any property interest in the 
settlement. Messina v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-107. 
The taxpayer had challenged in the Tax Court an IRS 
assessment based on payments made by a corporation, of which 
the taxpayer owned 40 percent of the stock, to the taxpayer 
as constructive dividends. The taxpayer was successful in 
challenging the assessment and sought recovery of litigation 
costs. See Morrison v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-53. However, 
the taxpayer acknowledged that the corporation had paid for all 
of	the	taxpayer’s	legal	costs	and	would	receive	any	litigation	cost	
award obtained by the taxpayer. The court held that the taxpayer 
could not recover the litigation costs because the taxpayer did not 
personally pay any of the litigation costs. Morrison v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2006-103. 
DEPENDENTS. The taxpayer was a native of Sudan and 
worked in the United States. The taxpayer claimed unrelated 
children	 as	 dependents	 based	 upon	 the	 taxpayer’s	 helping	
to	 support	 the	 children	 and	 the	 taxpayer’s	 claim	 that,	 under	
Sudanese custom, the children were related because they were 
part of the same tribe as the taxpayer. The children lived with one 
of their biological parents in a separate apartment. The taxpayer 
did	not	provide	written	evidence	of	any	payment	of	the	children’s	
expenses or how much support the children received from other 
sources, including their biological parents. The court denied the 
deduction because the taxpayer was not related to the children, 
as	defined	by	I.R.C.	§	152,	and	did	not	prove	that	the	taxpayer	
provided	more	than	one-half	of	the	children’s	support	or	that	the	 
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children lived with the taxpayer. Aruai v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2006-98. 
IRA. The taxpayer owned three IRAs. The taxpayer received 
a $7,000 distribution from one IRA on February 26, 1996. The 
taxpayer made a contribution to another IRA of $7,000 on April 
30, 1996, 64 days after the distribution. The taxpayer argued 
that the contribution was a rollover of the distribution from the 
first	IRA	to	the	second	IRA	and	the	taxpayer	offered	testimony	
as to the reason why the rollover was four days late. The court 
found	 the	 taxpayer’s	 testimony	 inconsistent	 and	held	 that	 the	
contribution to the second IRA did not qualify as a rollover and 
had	to	be	included	in	the	taxpayer’s	income.		Mostafa v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2006-106. 
LEGAL FEES. The taxpayer was incarcerated in a state 
prison. The prison had restricted the mail of inmates to prohibit 
the receipt of any blank IRS forms. Although the taxpayer did 
not receive all necessary documents, the taxpayer was able to 
file	a	federal	tax	return	for	2001.	In	March	2002,	the	taxpayer	
filed	a	suit	to	enjoin	the	prison	from	restricting	the	taxpayer’s	
mail	as	to	financial	statements	and	IRS	tax	forms.	The	taxpayer	
then	claimed	the	legal	expenses	of	that	filing	as	a	deduction	on	
the 2001 tax return, arguing that the expenses were related to 
the	filing	of	the	2001	tax	return.	The	court	held	that	 the	legal	
expenses were eligible for a deduction only for 2002, the year 
in which the expenses were paid. Dehoney v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2006-108. 
LIkE-kIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer owned a gold 
mine and exchanged the gold mine for a coal mine owned by an 
unrelated company. The coal mine assets and liabilities included 
supply contracts which, under New Mexico law, were considered 
covenants running with the real property containing the coal; 
therefore, the court held that the supply contracts were part of 
the real property exchanged for the gold mine. The court held 
that the exchange of the gold mine and coal mine was entitled 
to like-kind exchange treatment under I.R.C. § 1031. The Digest
will publish an article on this case by Neil Harl in a future issue. 
Peabody Natural Resources Co. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. No. 14 
(2006). 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayer was a 
corporate subsidiary of a corporation which was a subsidiary of 
the parent corporation. The taxpayer was restructured to become 
the subsidiary of a new corporation which was a subsidiary of 
the parent corporation. The taxpayer was further restructured 
as	a	limited	liability	company.	The	taxpayer’s	business	was	the	
providing	of	truck	drivers	for	the	parent	corporation’s	trucking	
business. The taxpayer received prepayments for these services. 
The advance payments were not determined by any advance 
hiring of drivers and were not refundable if drivers were not hired 
by the parent from the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the advance 
payments were recognized as income to the taxpayer when paid 
because the taxpayer had full control over the funds and was 
not required to make any refunds. The taxpayer had adopted 
the deferral method of accounting but had not obtained IRS 
consent for the accounting change. The IRS ruled that the change 
in accounting method required IRS consent, under Rev. Proc. 
71-21, 1971-1 C.B. 549, because the taxpayer was considered 
a related party to the parent corporation under I.R.C. § 482 and 
Treas. Reg. § 482-1(a). T.A.M. 200619023, Feb. 1, 2006. 
RETURNS. The IRS has posted to its website, www.irs.
ustreas.gov, in the Forms & Pubs section Publication 1542 (Rev. 
May	2006),	Per	Diem	Rates	(For	Travel	Within	the	Continental	
United States). There are changes in the per diem rates in 
Oakland, CA; Savannah, GA; Chicago, IL; Manhattan, NY; 
Charlotte,	NC;	Cincinnati,	OH;	Aiken,	SC;	and	Tacoma,	WA. 
S CORPORATIONS 
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayers, husband and 
wife, owned 50 percent of a partnership and 50 percent of an S
corporation. The partnership loaned money to the taxpayers who 
loaned the same money to the S corporation which paid the same 
amount in rent to the partnership. The principal and interest of 
the loans were not repaid. The partnership borrowed money on 
a nonrecourse basis from a third party and the loan agreement 
prohibited the partnership from using the loan proceeds in the 
loans described above. The agreement also required (1) the 
partnership	to	seek	the	lender’s	approval	for	any	partnership	loans	
to the taxpayers, (2) such loans had to be paid from partnership 
net	 profits,	 and	 (3)	 the	 loans	 were	 used	 to	 fund	 partnership	
activities. The taxpayers argued that the intercompany loans 
increased their basis in the S corporation because the loans were 
subject	to	collection	if	the	partnership’s	loans	ever	defaulted.	The	
IRS	ruled	that	the	taxpayers’	intercompany	loans	did	not	increase	
their basis in the S corporation because the loans required no 
economic	outlay	by	the	taxpayers	and	there	was	an	insignificant	
risk that the taxpayers would be held liable for the partnership 
loans. Ltr. Rul. 200619021, Feb. 7, 2006. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
June 2006 
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Rev. Rul. 2006-29, I.R.B. 2006-23. 
Short-term 
AFR 4.99 4.93 4.90 4.88 
110 percent AFR 
120 percent AFR 
5.49 5.42 
6.01 5.92 
Mid-term 
5.38 
5.88 
5.36 
5.85 
AFR 5.06 5.00 4.97 4.95 
110 percent AFR 
120 percent AFR 
AFR 
5.58 5.50 
6.09 6.00 
Long-term
5.32 5.25 
5.46 
5.96 
5.22 
5.44 
5.93 
5.19 
110 percent AFR 
120 percent AFR 
5.86 
6.40 
5.78 
6.30 
5.74 
6.25 
5.71 
6.22 
UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME. The taxpayer was 
a community college which received some unimproved real 
property as a gift. The property had an old dead-end street through 
it and the city decided to complete the street and rezone the area 
as commercial. The taxpayer had the property platted and divided 
into lots for sale. The only advertising for the sale was notices in 
the newspaper, although a broker was to be hired if the lots did 
not sell. The proceeds of the sales of the lots were to be used to 
Agricultural Law Press
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construct a new student dormitory on campus. The IRS ruled that 
the proceeds of the sales would not be unrelated business income 
to the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 200619024, Feb. 16, 2006. 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. The plaintiff entered into a 
five-year	lease	of	farm	land	and	had	farmed	the	land	for	one	year	
and	paid	the	next	year’s	rent	in	advance	when	the	land	was	sold.	
The new owner, the defendant, entered the land and forcibly evicted 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for reinstatement of the lease and 
for treble damages for forcible eviction. The trial court ruled that a 
valid lease existed and awarded monetary damages to the plaintiff 
based on one lease year. The amount of damages or how they were 
calculated is not disclosed in the case. The plaintiff appealed, 
arguing that the lease should have been reinstated because monetary 
damages	were	inadequate.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	the	denial	of	
specific	performance	to	reinstate	the	lease	because	it	was	not	shown	
that	monetary	damages	were	not	a	sufficient	remedy.	The	trial	court	
had made no ruling on the treble damages for forcible eviction and 
the appellate court remanded the case for a determination by the trial 
court as to whether the defendant used or threatened to use force in 
the eviction of the plaintiff. The court held that treble damages were 
warranted even though force was not used; the plaintiff was entitled 
to treble damages if the threat of force was present and “justly to be 
feared.” Livinggood v. Balsdon, 709 N.W.2d 723 (N.D. 2006). 
PROPERTY LAW 
HUNTING. The plaintiffs were farmers who owned and operated 
cattle and crop raising activities on farm land and who owned and 
operated hunting lodges and preserves in South Dakota. The South 
Dakota legislature enacted S.D. Code L. § 41-9-1.1(2) which allowed 
the hunting of small game, except mourning doves, without a 
landowner’s	permission	if	(1)	the	game	is	located	on	a	public	highway	
or	public	right-of-way	or	(2)	the	game	is	in	flight	over	private	land	
if the small game originated from a highway or public right-of-way. 
The plaintiffs argued that the statute was an unconstitutional taking 
of their property rights without compensation. The court upheld the 
statute as constitutional in that the statute did not take any property 
right for which the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. Benson 
88 
v. State of South Dakota, 710 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 2006). 
WATER RIGHTS 
JURSIDICTION. The plaintiff and defendant owned fractional 
shares	 of	water	 rights	 in	 three	 ditches.	The	 plaintiff	 filed	 suit	
for damages based on allegations that the defendant had used, 
intentionally and negligently, more water from the ditches than 
was	allowed	under	the	defendant’s	water	rights,	causing	a	loss	
of	water	available	to	the	plaintiff.	The	plaintiff’s	claims	included	
negligent irrigation, trespass and nuisance based on allegations that 
the	defendant	had	allowed	water	to	flood	the	plaintiff’s	land.	The	
defendant answered that the claims were barred by the doctrine 
of laches, the statute of limitations, waiver and contributory 
negligence. The trial court had ruled for the defendant, holding that 
the	defendant	had	acquired	the	plaintiff’s	water	right	by	adverse	
possession. The appellate court raised the issue of jurisdiction of 
the trial court and stated that the jurisdiction for issues involving 
rights	to	water	were	exclusive	to	the	Water	Court.	The	appellate	
court held that the negligent irrigation, trespass and nuisance 
claims were properly in the jurisdiction of the trial court because 
the claims did not involve rights to water but primarily the use 
of the water; therefore, the appellate court upheld the trial court 
dismissal	of	those	claims	for	lack	of	proof	of	the	flooding	and	
any damages. On the adverse possession ruling, however, the 
appellate court reversed, holding that, because the issue involved 
the	parties’	rights	to	water,	exclusive	jurisdiction	for	the	case	was	
with	 the	Water	Court.	Archuleta v. Gomez, 2006 Colo. App. 
LEXIS 632 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). 
IN THE NEWS 
EXPORTS. The European Union has announced that it is 
dropping plans to reintroduce sanctions on U.S. goods due to a 
provision in tax H.R. 4297 (signed by the President on May 17, 
2006) repealing transitional extraterritorial income exclusion 
binding contract relief. IP/06/606 (May 12, 2006). 
SALES TAX. The Governor of Georgia has signed H.B. 834 
into law which provides a two-year (July 1, 2006 - June 30, 2008) 
sales	tax	exemption	for	liquefied	petroleum	gas	or	any	fuel	used	
in a structure where swine are raised. 
